注释： [1]World Bank 1992, 3 & 140. [2]Dikötter 2016, 263. [3]Maddison 2010; Wu 2014. [4]The official verdict wasgiven in On Questions of Party History (1981); see Liuand Wu 1986, 587. [5]Macfarquhar andSchoenhals 2006; Dikötter 2016; Walder 2015. [6]Dikötter 2016, 284. [7]Walder 2015, 321&332-33. [8]According to People’s Daily(8.11.2013), “We must fully acknowledge….thetremendous achievements in the period before reform and openingup.” Politicalimperatives, namely the need tolegitimate Party rule, have also played a keyrole in developing this two-period’ analysis. [9]Li 2008; Gao 2008; Han2000; Hinton 1991; Bramall 1993, 2000, and 2007; Blecher2009 [10]The figures for Chinaare my new estimate; see Bramall(forthcoming). For Britain, see Broadberry2015, 289. Regional data alsosuggest that Lancashire and Yorkshire were lowwage counties in around 1770(Hunt 1986, 965). But Broadberry’spessimistic view is controversial; According to Kelly and O'Grada(2014, 7),"...consumption levels [were] comfortably above barebonessubsistence onthe eve of the Industrial Revolution." See also Allen 2009. [11] Crafts 1985; 2014. [12]Ho 1994; White 1998. [13]See JGK 1999, NYTJ 1976, NCJJ 2000 and NYFX 1979. [14]For the secondary literature on agriculture, see Huang 1990. Forrural industry, Ho 1994, Mo 1987 and Whiting 2001. On industry more generally,Bramall 2007. For useful overviews, see Marton 2000 and White 1998. [15]Communes routinely under-reported production to avoid procurements(see for example Oi 1989). In addition, the growth surge shown by the officialagricultural data for 1978-1984 is simply too large to be plausible. As Hinton(1991) has argued, the surge reflected under-reporting in 1978 that was largelycorrected by 1984. [16]Fei 1983; Ma 2008. [17]The expansion of education is not discussed in this article. Thisis partly because of space constraints, but also because formal education wasless important in driving growth than other factors, notably skills acquiredvia learning-by-doing in industry. For a discussion, see Bramall 2007. [18]Davis 1979, 94-97; Timmins 1998,85. [19]Growth rates at constant prices.From SSB 2010. [20]Jiangsu tongjiju 1989. [21]'Urban industry' here means allindustrial production in the cities-proper of Nanjing, Wuxi, Xuzhou, Changzhou,Suzhou, Nantong, Lianyungang, Huaiyin, Yancheng, Yangzhou, Taizhou andZhenjiang. All GVIO in county jurisdictions is classified as rural; this ruraldefinition therefore includes the shedui sector but also county-levelcollective and state-owned industries. Although crude, this measure capturesthe breadth of rural industry better than the shedui definition. [22]The absence of migration controlsduring the Leap—and the subsequent flood of migrantsfrom rural to urban areas—exacerbated the Great Famineby causing rural labour shortages. [23]For overviews of Chinese ruralindustrialization, see Riskin 1978, Sigurdson 1977, Perkins 1992, He 2004,Dangdai Zhongguo de xiangzhen qiye weiyuanhui 1991; 2009 and Bramall 2007. Forrural industrialization in Jiangsu, see Ho 1994, White 1998, Whiting 2001 andBramall 2007. [24]This is for GVIO at 1990 prices(Jiangsu tongjiju 1994). [25]Data at 1980 prices from Jiangsutongjiju 1989, 137 and He 2004, 28 & 31. [26]In Jiangsu, 17 per cent ofindustrial output originated in the shedui sector in 1978, double the nationalaverage (He 2004, 31; SSB 1990). [27]Even Dikötter (2016, 279-80)acknowledges Jiangsu's pace of industrialization during the 1970s. [28]Sunan (southern Jiangsu) is moreaccurate than Jiangnan ('south of the river') because rural industries alsodeveloped rapidly along the north bank of the Yangzi. Useful sources include Mo1987; Zhou 1994; WXG 1990. [29]Rural Suxichang is defined hereas the counties of Jiangyin, Yixing, Shazhou, Changshu, Taicang, Kunshan,Wujiang, Wuxian, Wuxi (county), Wujin, Jintan and Liyang. Data are for GVIO at1990 constant prices (Jiangsu tongjiju 1994). [30] Jiangsu tongjiju 1989. [31]Jiangsu tongjiju 1989, 137; 1994,69. These data are for commune-level industry and higher at 1980 prices. Thefigures exclude counties under the jurisdiction of Nanjing municipality. [32]JGK 1989, 13-16 [33]Jiangsu tongjiju 1994, 195 &511. The data are for Wuxi and Suzhou cities [34]Turner 1982, 509. The Lancashirefigures may be exaggerated. [35]Apostolides 2008, 32 & 34;Broadberry 2015, 88 & 92. 'North' includes Cheshire, Nottinghamshire andStaffordshire. [36]SSB 2010. [37]The kouliang (口粮) measures per capita grain distributed by the collective. Reportedkouliang figures under-state total consumption because of outputunder-reporting and the exclusion of grain grown on private plots. Conversely,the kouliang is not a measure of direct human grain consumption because somecollectively-distributed grain was used as pig feed. This last apparentlimitation is an advantage in assessing living standards because the kouliangcaptures indirect consumption of grain in the form of pork. [38]For the data, see Nongye bu1981,178. [39]NYTJ 1976, 122-23 & 356-58;Jiangsu tongjiju 1994, 205-613. Suzhou is defined here as Jiangyin, Wuxicounty, Shazhou (contemporary Zhangjiagang), Changshu, Taicang, Kunshan, Wuxianand Wujiang counties. [40]Constant price agriculturalvalue-added in Jiangsu rose by 2.4 per cent per year during 1965-78. If wecompare this with the rates achieved by other Asian economies early in theireconomic development, it was clearly lower than the 2.8 per cent achieved byJapan during 1955-70 (Hayami and Yamada 1991, 19), Taiwan's rate of 3.7 per centduring 1951-70 (Thorbecke 1979, 135) and South Korea's 4 per cent for 1960-75(World Bank 2017). [41]Gao 1999; Hinton 1991. [42]This programme is usuallyabbreviated as gangyao (纲要) in the Chinese literature,and counties meeting their yield target are often described as having achievedgangyao. [43]The Huai was the traditionalboundary between north and south China (see Buck 1937, 9) because it marked thelimit of rice cultivation. Historically, the Huai river entered the Yellow seaat Yuntiguan in Xiangshui county. By the 1950s, however, much of the river'swater entered Lake Hongze and thence flowed south to the Yangzi; the old rivercourse was used to build the North Jiangsu Irrigation Canal. Nevertheless, theold course was adopted as the southern demarcation line for the agriculturalregion between the Huai and Yellow rivers; see the map in People's Daily on 25December 1957. [44]Nongye bu 1960, 120-21. Chinesedata on grain yields are usually given as output per sown unit or danchan (单产). However, the gangyao targets were in terms of grain output perunit of cultivated (arable) area, or nianmuchan (年亩产);see Nongye bu 1960, 8. [45]Parts of China had already hitthe gangyao target by 1957; there were nine gangyao counties in Sichuan andfour in Zhejiang (Nongye bu 1959, 120-21). [46]See NYFX 1979, 317. The cities ofZhenjiang, Taizhou, Yangzhong and Nantong posted high grain yields but werepart of the counties of Dantu, Nantong, Hanjiang and Taixian respectively in1957, rather than independent county-level jurisdictions. [47]Nonglin bu 1972, 44; Nongye bu1960, 120-21; Jiangsu tongjiju 1977, pp. 35-36. [48]NYFX 1979, 2. [49]The data used in Figure 3 are perunit of cultivated area to make them correspond with the gangyao targets. Theyield increase between 1957 and 1978 therefore reflected both changes inmultiple cropping and increases in yield per unit of sown area. In fact,grain-sown area declined from 119.7 million mu in 1957 to 94.7 million mu in1978, whereas grain yield per sown mu rose from 178 jin to 480 jin (NYFX 1979,2). By comparison, the grain yield per unit of sown area was 184 jin during1933-36 and 162 jin in 1952 (Jiangsu sheng nonglinting 1992, 9). [50]HYTJ 1991, 62-64. [51] We often think of Maoist growthas being investment-led, but of course capital is a product of labour, whetheralive or dead (we can think of the machines used to produce machines as deadlabour). It is for this reason that the mobilization of labour, and using it toproduce capital rather than consumption goods, is one of the key elements inthe development process. [52]Jiangsu TJNJ 2006, 79. [53]De Vries 1994. [54]NJZ 1983, 46; Han 1992, 500. [55]Jiangsu tongjiju 1977, 235. [56]My argument in this section thatlate Maoist development was constrained by labour shortages is controversial insome quarters, and one anonymous referee took issue with it. However, the veryfact that the number of days worked per worker rose over time, the emphasisgiven to agricultural mechanization in the 1970s, and the abundant evidencethat double and triple cropping was often prevented by seasonal labourshortages all point in this direction. So too does the share of the populationaged 15 to 64. This fell from 60 percent in 1953 to 56 percent in 1964. By1990, it was up to 67 percent; the 1990s were therefore the era of labourabundance in China, not the 1960s. One can of course argue that there would nothave been shortages if Maoist China had adopted a 'capitalist' developmentmodel. However, it is not clear that this is a reasonable counterfactual—American hostility made extensive international trade all butimpossible before the late 1970s. This environment forced China to adopt adevelopment model which was based around mass labour mobilization; it hadlittle choice. [57] Rice in Jiangsu yielded 515 jinper sown mu in 1965 compared with 285 jin for corn, 254 jin for potatoes and165 jin for wheat (NYTJ 1976, 42). Hybrid rice occupied 12 per cent ofrice-sown area and yielded 20 percent more per hectare than middle rice in 1978(Jiangsu tongjiju 1979, 66-67). [58]NYTJ 1976. [59] Perkins et al 1977, 80. Theygive grain-processing—which employed large numbers ofwomen—as an example of an area where mechanization wasgiven high priority. [60]Other parts of China experiencedfaster population growth (growth averaged 2.1 percent nationally per yearcompared with 1.8 per cent in Jiangsu for 1952-78) but water shortages meantthey were less able to use the population ‘gift’ effectively. [61] In Guangdong, the proportion ofnet per capita income contributed by household production rose from 33 per centin 1963-65 to 41 per cent in 1977-78; see Guangdong sheng tongjiju 1989, 78-79.Nationally, however, the household share was lower in 1977-78 (28 per cent)than it had been in 1963-65 (34 per cent); see NJZ 1983, 523. [62]NCJJ 2000, 153-54. [63]Huang 1990. As discussed earlier,stagnant living standards do not of themselves preclude an unfolding industrialrevolution. [64]SSB 2010, 394. [65]NCJJ 2000, 249, 329 and 334;Taicang xianzhi 1991, 179. [66] Jiangsu tongjiju 1989, 135. [67]The Great Leap Forward is omittedfor clarity, and I have divided the post-1962 period into the sub-periods of1962-70 and 1970-78. [68]Maddison 2010. [69]Zhejiang tongjiju 2010. [70]Regional GDP data for Britain in1861, based on an eleven-region division (with Scotland and Wales classified asregions), reveal that the combined share of the north-west and Yorkshire in GDPwas about 18 per cent (Geary and Stark 2015. 130). Jiangsu's 1978 share inChinese GDP was less than 7 per cent and, even with Zhejiang, just over 10 percent. Including Shanghai, however, produces a Yangzi delta share of almost 18per cent (SSB 2010). [71]The population census of 1831 putthe combined populations of Lancashire and Yorkshire at 2.7 million, 16 percent of Britain's population. Salford's population alone amounted to 430,000 in1831 (BPP 1833, xii, xix and 304). By contrast, Jiangsu's 1978 population of58.3 million was colossal by British standards, but only 6 per cent of theChinese total. [72]Hunt 1986; Williamson 1991. [73]Timmins 1998, 98. [74]Jiangsu tongjiju 1989, 137 [75]The Third Front province ofSichuan recorded a 1978 share of 58 per cent. Interestingly, Guangdong's heavyindustry share (43 per cent) was a little lower than Jiangsu's (SSB 1990;Guangdong tongjiju 1989). [76]The Third Front province ofSichuan recorded a 1978 share of 58 per cent. Interestingly, Guangdong's heavyindustry share (43 per cent) was a little lower than Jiangsu's (SSB 1990;Guangdong tongjiju 1989). [77]Broadberry 2015, 176. [78]Timmins 1998, 116. [79]Timmins 1998, 116. [80]Rodrik 2016. [81] As an aside, note that Jiangsuwas much better-placed in the late 1970s for sustained growth than those poorcountries which have based their growth around capital inflows, aid or acommodity boom (such as Venezuela). [82]The argument, suggestingsimilarities between Singapore and the Soviet Union, and contrasts to HongKong, was advanced by Young 1992 and subsequently popularized by Krugman 1994. [83]For the debate, see the recentcontributions of Allen 2009, and Humphries and Schneider 2016. [84]Ashton 1948. According to Davis(1979, 10): 'The initiative [for the industrial revolution] came from thesupply side, from technical change in the manufacture of cotton, in an industrywhich hitherto had been almost negligible and one which with its old techniqueswould have remained so.' [85]In more theoretical terms, ashift in the aggregate production function (technical progress) is assumed tobe distinct from a movement along the function (an input increase). [86]VonTunzelmann 1978. [87] Broadberry 2015, 367; Crafts 2014; Antras and Voth 2003. [88]Moreover, as Ellen Meiksins Wood (1991) reminds us, theanti-manufacturing bias of British financial capital meant that the Britishexperience demonstrates the limitations of certain types of capitalist systems. [89] SSB 1985, 185-186. [90] WXG 1990. [91]NCJJ 2000; Jiangsu tongjiju 1994. 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