在哔站看到了半外围论和中帝论的辩论

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§56

Marxists as early as Plekhanov have also opted for regressing into Spinozism as a means to resolve the problem, where subject and object collapse into the supreme Substance. In this way thinking consciousness is the mere attribute of Substance: the most fundamental form of Being.

§57

Soviet Philosopher Ilyenkov, goes so far as to draw out speculative cosmological implications of this view, according to which thought arises as a necessary attribute of matter to prevent the heat death of the universe, by initiating a conscious cosmic catastrophe to reset it.

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§58

The problem with Spinozism is not the view that mind and matter (‘subject and object’) share reality, but in the notion of reality as ‘Substance:’ a metaphysical view of the object already united with its subjective determinations. Substance thus has no stake in its attributes.

§59

This is just one of the ways of ‘resolving’ the problem by denying it all together: Substance is mere objectivity given Form by the mind. Substance is treated as supreme, antecedent, and given, but it is the repository of a dogmatic subjective determination, not true objectivity.

§60

The Marxist-Spinozist view cannot ground the origins of proletarian consciousness, Marxism, and the Communist party in reality - it represses its own origins, and pretends these arise in perfect continuity with the self-same Substance, effectively gaslighting itself.

§61

This view does not arise from any necessary procedure of thought, experience, or relation to the world. It is a metaphysical view that does not pay for itself in any way - it is an insight that cannot itself be reproduced materially, a pure dogmatism of the mind.

§62

There never comes the decisive gesture of Marx of renouncing knowledge to suspend it back into Being - Substance is the conceit of a knowledge that already inheres in Being, perfectly continuous with the intellect which at no point runs upon the limit of its pretentions.

§63

In practice, it becomes a type of ideological hubris, asserting the unreality and meaninglessness of every actually substantive bond of civilization, in favor of a supreme ‘Substance’ that has neither any skin of its own in the game, nor any reality outside a calcified intellect.

§64

More importantly, it renders Scientific Socialism into a metaphysical dogma, incapable of deriving concrete knowledge of concrete social reality. No specificity of societal objectivity is possible - everything is just ‘capitalism’ permeating the whole of its ‘attributes.’

§65

It is obvious that if ‘everything’ is objective, then nothing in particular is, including society itself. The extent of society’s objectivity is the extent it is continuous with a dogma of the mind. It is no wonder Spinoza is the favorite thinker of pseudo-Marxist academia!

§66

Spinozism is categorically incompatible with Marxism for no other reason than that its foundations make impossible insight into laws governing historical development, and the particular qualitative character of societies. It could not possibly constitute any class-consciousness.

§67

Specifically, it cannot afford any recognition of the objectivity of contradictions (such as the class struggle). In the stead of the objectivity of class struggle lies a pure subjectivist ‘will to immanence,’ a notion of communism as antisocial as Lukácsian “self-consciousness.”

§68

The scholastic concept Substance does not resolve the object-subject distinction (the principal theoretical problem of Western Marxism), but only conceals it. For the 100+ years Western Marxism has confused it with Marx’s materialism, Marxism was condemned metaphysical languish.

§69

It suffices only to recall Marx’s own apt view of Spinoza: A metaphysically disguised objectivity which excludes the objectivity of man, and therefore the socius relevant for Marx’s own materialism.

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§70

Marxism succeeded in overcoming metaphysics, but only within a limited scope of practice. That is namely in the investigations of Marx in Capital, the writings of Fredrich Engels and the concrete historical experience of Marxism-Leninism.

§71

Marx and Engels failed to fully transmit their theoretical genius. Lenin alone inherited it, and gave it practical reality. The genius of Marxism survived as the genius of world-historical statesmen and civilizations, but its original spark of consciousness was lost.

§72

Marxism-Leninism emerged as a type of phronesis, whose advanced outlook was established by the context of the concrete historical experience of Communism. Not strictly a matter of theoretical intellect, but also a type of advanced sensibility based on practical reality.

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§73

Marx’s Promethean gesture acquired objective reality and history exclusively outside the West, where objectivity of society was not metaphysical question, but a given reality. And the problem of metaphysics permeated the whole of Western thinking, not just Western Marxism.

§74

For Marxism to be meaningful in the West, it cannot ignore this problem, for when it does, it always remains trapped within it anyway, inevitably regressing materialist objectivity from practical Scientific Socialism into the scholastic Kantian or Spinozist frame.

§75

In the case of Kantianism (as in Lukács), proletarian objectivity dissolves in the subjectivism of social-dem institutions. In Spinozism, it becomes an intellectual conceit devoid of skin in the game. Revisionism, opportunism, and defeatism are the certain conclusion of both.

§76

The object in the form of ‘capitalism’ - whether as Thing or Substance - becomes so overwhelming and insurmountable, that the comparative weakness of Marxist subjectivity takes in. The paranoiac spectre of ‘fascism’ reflects a consciousness always in retreat before its object.

§77

And hardly anything could affirm that paranoia more than the fact that the thinker who finally initiated the revolution that would emancipate the Western mind from bourgeois metaphysics once and for all, is nearly equally infamous for their affiliation to German Nazism.

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§78

Originally a student of Husserl and the phenomenological school, Martin Heidegger inadvertently lays the foundation for a complete rediscovery of Marx, emancipating Western thought from its metaphysical shackles and opening the way for a truly consistent materialist outlook.

§79

Heidegger elects to orient thought to an origin more fundamental than can be contained within the frame of the reductionist ‘res cogitans/'extensa’ or ‘subject/object’ distinction, and that is toward Being as such. This is the beginning of what is popularly called ontology.

§80

For Heidegger, Being as such pre-exists the classification, categorization, utilization, etc. of particular beings by thought. It is the ‘Being of beings’ - the more fundamental ground by which particular beings are given to us - whether in experience, contemplation, or practice.

§81

He calls the difference between Being & beings the Ontological Difference. Every relation to beings, is based on a fundamental horizon of Being as such. When a specific horizon acquires historical dominance, it is metaphysical - imposing upon Being a specific relation by thought.

§82

The view of the thinking being is set on a foundation far less metaphysically loaded than the Cartesian Subject: as Dasein, a being for which there is a question or openness of Being. Dasein embodies the very discontinuity of Being that justifies the Ontological Difference.

§83

The problem with the subject-object distinction is that it can only regard beings as objects for a given subject. This makes for a notion of objectivity that is a priori idealist. The notion of Subject also implies a specific view of objects as mere utilities for its realization.

§84

Subject, moreover, defined as res cogita, is thought itself taken as its own real object. This implies an alienation of thought from reality, foreclosing its scandalous incipience in Being. This notion is the final conclusion of idealism; for Heidegger metaphysics as such.

§85

Marx already accomplished the rejection of the culmination of idealist philosophy, especially in his early writings. But the incipient materialist language he made use of (man, class, mode of production, etc.), later fell victim to inevitably metaphysical conceptualizations.

§86

Some of these Concepts were involved in the first breakdown of European Marxism itself. The changing nature of capitalist production & role of the proletariat ceased to neatly conform to their Concept, and this was used by Social Democracy to justify its revisionism.

§87

Western Marxism, with its conceptualist orthodoxy, became infiltrated by metaphysics, so it is natural that only a Western thinker entirely outside Marxism - and even entirely opposed to it politically - could initiate the emancipation of Western thought from metaphysics.

§88

Heidegger may have been beset by various idealistic and politically objectionable peculiarities, but these do not define his primary historical significance. His primary significance lies in setting all thought on a basis which asserts its posteriority in the face of Being.

§89

The concept of Dasein helps resolve the fundamental problem of Marxist theory: The Subject/Object paradox and its methodological individualism. For the first time, society, classes, and civilizations can be acknowledged as real in a manner consistent with the materialist view.

§90

Dasein does not necessarily afford contemplation exclusive significance in its overall issue of Being, so it is not just another concept of the subject: Not simply cognition, but practically being-in-the-world, facing the constitutive disjuncture with Being in its very Being.

§91

This overall phenomenological orientation permits thought to acknowledge reality without preemptively attempting to assume the consequences or implications it has for the thinking being. Whatever consequences or implications there may be, they begin with being, not thought.

§92

It is undoubtedly possible that Dasein can be conceived exclusively as an individual, but unlike the concept of the Subject, it is not necessarily so. Being as such is a common well-spring that cuts across individuated ‘subjects,’ and is the staging ground of any shared reality.

§93

Moreover, without acknowledging the incipience of thought from more fundamental Being, Marxist materialism becomes an absurdity: Materiality becomes identical to the thought of materiality (like Substance), and thus an idea! In this way, materialism easily becomes idealism.

§94

Dasein is constitutively a being already thrown in a world, a world not only not of its choosing, but whose givenness, in the form of beings, cannot be pre-emptively defined by thoughts, ideas or concepts. It rather rests upon a relation to Being as such, which can only be uncovered.

§95

The real individual is thus set against a background within which their very individuated identity is subordinated to a more fundamental horizon of Being. Dasein, in its incipience, knows no distinction between individuals, or itself and others. It is not even a collective.

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§96

Typically, Marxists try to resolve antinomy of sociality (either the sum-total of individual subjects or a collective subject individuals are part of) by just grotesquely defining it as a ‘complex’ of relationships between individuals, too numerous to ground in anything definite.

§97

The concept of Dasein, properly speaking, does not necessarily even imply individuated identity, let alone a grouping of individuals - but a more fundamental and antecedent background from which individuals acquire distinction, place and identity within a world.

§98

The simultaneous quality of being open to Being, while also itself Being, implies Dasein as an incipience of thought that goes from the question of a subject faced with its object, to a quality of the ‘object’ itself, as originally discontinuous with regard to itself.

§99

A Dasein is already immersed within a world, and is a grounded existence while simultaneously corresponding to an openness of Being at issue with, or at least discontinuous with that existence. Yet said Being is nothing more than the very Being of Dasein itself.

§100

This ontological difference (between a world of beings and Being as such) is not antagonistic, since Being merely discloses itself, implying not that it is at odds with the world, only given privileged significance in the way it reveals itself to Dasein, in contrast to beings.

§101

Particular beings acquire definition in their use, or general significance, but their real meaning is always metonymic, always referring to something more fundamental than themselves: Being as such is thus also the ultimate horizon of meaningfulness to which beings are referred.

§102

The definition of a Dasein itself, lies at the point in which it faces the threshold beyond which it cannot cross, simultaneously defining the whole of what it is. Typically understood as a person’s death, but more importantly that within which Dasein may recognize its finitude.

§103

That is necessarily beyond any particular being; even individual ego. Being as such grounds the finitude of Dasein, and meaningfulness arises not simply in the physical death of a person, but in Being itself, so far as it sets upon the limits of its disclosure to a given Dasein.

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§104

Heidegger’s shortcoming lies in the ambiguity of Dasein. While Dasein is thrown into a given community, as an established horizon of being, it acquires an authentic relationship to Being only through the exercise of individual will, where it comes to acknowledge its finitude.

§105

Yet at the same time, the community is the very ground of Dasein, since ones relation toward others constitutes a given conventionally established horizon of being. What remains ambiguous is the antisocial status of the Being which discloses itself to Dasein.

§106

Experiencing finitude is necessarily individual, yet the status of the finitude of Being itself is not clear. This is heightened by the fact that for Heidegger, every determinacy of Being is metaphysical, closing the Ontological difference by reducing Being to a particular being.

§107

Though, Heidegger does not make clear how it is community acquires singularity of being, he grounds phenomenological Being the site of its conceivability, freeing it from the methodological individualism of intersubjectivity: and that is his principal achievement for Marxism.

§108

As shown, without the aid of Heidegger, Marxism inevitably regresses into metaphysics. But paradoxically, Heidegger’s understanding of metaphysics is the very chief defect of his outlook, not only condemning it to stagnation on his part, but placing it at risk of idealism.

§109

Heidegger makes no distinction, in his understanding of metaphysics, between Being in the specificity of its determination, and Being in the specificity of its understanding within the history of philosophy. He extends the label ‘metaphysics’ beyond the realm of thought.

§110

For him, metaphysics is an actuality. Thus, industrial capitalist modernity is itself the result of metaphysics and it is implied: a consequence of the history of philosophy. Obviously from an elementary Marxist, or even commonsense perspective, he gets the whole thing backwards.

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§111

To understand how Being itself acquires a specific determination, it suffices to return to the ontological difference between Being and particular beings. Heidegger situates this difference at the core of Dasein’s existential turmoil, for which Being is always at issue.

§112

This quandary, while not identical, at least parallels that of Kant, for whom the transcendental subject is likewise situated between the antinomies. So it suffices to ‘in parallel’ look to Hegel for the solution, and transpose the difference as a difference of Being itself.

§113

That is to say, the ontological difference should change the operative notion of Being in the first place, from its one-sided conception mired in the stillness of thought, to an understanding of Being as itself contradiction, difference, etc. in sum, a dialectical union of contraries.

§114

Thus Being as such acquires determinacy as an absolute ontological union of opposites, transposing the difference at the core of Dasein to a feature of Being itself. That there exists Dasein in the first place should change something about our understanding of Being itself.

§115

Yet in contrast to Hegel, it is not necessary to draw the conclusion that thought comprises the essential element in the contradiction at the heart of Being - The misstep of phenomenological Hegelians from Kojeve to Žižek, who regressed from Heidegger’s original achievement.

§116

The important conclusion is that ontology - taken not as a philosophical contemplation, but the real threshold by which mankind relates to Being as such - is itself actively suspended and itself reproduced within material reality, as the formative ground of all thought.

§117

This threshold lies not in the limits of philosophy, but in the limits of man’s existence itself, itself suspended in temporal history. Such a limit lies not in the threshold of man’s mastery over nature, but the limit by which man lives, relates to others and to things.

§118

Such a limit is not preempted by any philosophy, idea, or consciousness, but the genuine limit of man’s existence in relation to the whole of Being, conditioned not necessarily by physical limitation, but by the limit of the absolute contradiction which forms meaning itself.

§119

This can be understood as the contradiction between the givenness of being and Being as such, or between the determinate norms of civilization and their unity in a state authority, a specific frame of past and future, particular and universal, many and one, etc.

§120

Heidegger (at least in his early years) could not see that Dasein is not just a being for whom there is a question of Being - but also a being for whom that question is already resolved in a specific way. Heidegger assumed that resolution was necessarily metaphysical.

§121

While true for the history of philosophy, it is not true for living and real mankind, for whom the contradiction between the determinacy of Being and an appreciation for the ontological, is the very content of the latter. It is what gives Being itself meaning!

§122

The absolute contradiction is a contradiction of incipience, between determination and origins. The contingency of Dasein is not simply a matter of choice, as Heidegger thought, but in a determination whose ‘reason’ is only clear retroactively, like a wavefunction collapse.

§123

A civilization is the way it is, not because it is physically impossible for it to be any other way, but precisely because it is physically possible. Only by assuming one determination against a background of many, can a higher reason participate in the development of a people.

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§124

Western Marxism, before it engages in ‘historical materialist’ analysis, projects a vulgar metaphysical view (rejected by Marx & Engels) of humanity, according to which mankind dwells at the precipice of physical extinction. Thus, everything about society is reduced to survival.

§124.1

Hence, class struggle ultimately reduces to the Rational Choice Individual, and one group merely finds itself disadvantaged with regard to others, on account of being unable to fulfill the desires, or restricting the choices of individuals. What is problematic about this is clear

§124.2

It clearly contrasts with the Marxist view of class struggle, which situates class antagonism within a single division of labor, as a contradiction at the core of being itself - giving it ontological significance, rather than a result of clashing individuals.

§125

Understanding any given civilization, is simply a matter of understanding the mode of production. The problem is they never bother to ask exactly what is being produced in the first place. They begin and end with the individual, effectively arriving at no real knowledge at all.

§126

The problem of course is that the individual is situated within a more fundamental horizon by which they relate to others, to things, etc. This jibber-jabber is well-known to ‘Marxists,’ but precisely what is meant by it, at the objective material level they never make clear.

§127

A mode of production is the mode by which something is reproduced; that something can’t just be the individual. For a mode of production to be general, it must itself have a general object, otherwise the entire concept becomes completely useless.

§128

To begin, this object - which is really the specific Being of Dasein - must be a specific logic of reproduction. You could call it a unit of civilization, or a division of labor. Marxoids have devoted an eternity of soliloquies to Capital as a logic of reproduction.

§129

Capital, whose logic is standardization, abstraction, and utilitarianism is not a specific logic, but an empty universalism, which concludes with modern American ‘civilisation,’ and now a mere extension of Church of Cartesian metaphysics (govt, financial institutions etc).

§130

M-C-M’ is merely the form of reproduction of the modern European polity; the abstraction of the commodity form corresponding to the abstraction of the state. Capital is not an autonomous process, but a civilizational quandary. A deeper object has precedence over it.

§131

In a sense, Heidegger is right that ontology here possesses primacy. Before there was capitalism, there was a more fundamental way European civilization came to relate to Being as a whole. That is not to say the latter is arbitrary - on the contrary, it is world-historical.

§132

The point is that in contrast to the vulgar materialist view, all of mankind’s ‘metaphysical,’ spiritual, cultural, scientific, etc. questions, aspirations, fears and dreams were bound up with the development of capitalism, reflecting their highest relation to Being as such.

§133

To know a logic of reproduction, is to know what is most sacred, fundamental, and ontological for a given people. No abstract, mechanical geometrical, or arithmetic conception of physical production suffices to produce knowledge of any given mode of production.

§134

It is clear that Heidegger, though providing the foundation for a Marxism freed from metaphysics, hardly allows us to go this far with the concept of Dasein. But at the very least, with the help of Hegel, it is possible to grasp ontological difference as a feature of Being itself

§135

That is the second most important step to arriving at a true conception of the objectivity of society, after Heidegger’s phenomenological turn itself. That is because it establishes Being as a specific contradiction, thus having some kind of finitude beyond individual death.

§136

This does not yet tell us anything particular about any specific Dasein. For that to be possible, it is necessary to take a fundamental step beyond Heidegger and beyond the West itself. Heidegger gave us an escape from metaphysics - but not a perspective already outside of it.

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§137

It was Aleksandr Dugin who accomplished the particularization of Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, thus allowing for it to be put to work in productive, even practical ways. And he does this by returning to the beginning of metaphysics according to Heidegger - in Logos.