在哔站看到了半外围论和中帝论的辩论

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§31

In the realm of science: Metaphysical distrust in reality takes the form of distrust in our conventions, intuitions, religious beliefs, and sensibilities about the nature of reality.

Reality is a pure OUTSIDE only accessed by cold, indifferent, impersonal inquiry.

§32

In the realm of politics: Metaphysical distrust in reality takes the form of distrust in traditional sovereign authority, regarding it as unjust, arbitrary, and tyrannical.

Sovereigns must be legitimated by some explicitly abstract constitutional or democratic procedure.

§33

Wokeness is just the applying it to the realm of culture, where the unwritten norms of civilization secretly disguise relationships of injustice, oppression, and marginalization - by virtue of not being premised by expressly consensual, rational, etc. consciousness.

§34

In bourgeois modernity, only what is in the sphere of explicit responsibility of conscious subjects can be ‘trusted.’

Any recognition of humanity in reality itself is no different than a superstition: Reality is arbitrary, meaningless, and malign. Only institutions are Good.

§35

The madness of bourgeois capitalism, which alienates mankind from its material being, is the true culprit behind the Woke phenomena, NOT Marxism.

All Lukács did was make Marxism compatible with bourgeois institutions. The original problem is the bourgeoisie itself.

§36

The Gnostic, occultist, and alchemical origins of the bourgeois enlightenment are abundantly clear. Lindsay accuses of Marxism, what is in fact THE FOUNDATION OF LIBERALISM!

Marxism is the exact OPPOSITE of this bourgeois conceit of knowledge (gnosis), formalism, and wokeness.

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§37

In Marxism, the highest aim of knowledge is to give way to reality. This entails a great trust in material being - anything of importance arrived at by knowledge, is already reconciled within material reality itself.

The paradox is that this ‘giving way’ is a necessary act
of consciousness.

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§38

Lukács’ response to this paradox revised Marxism itself. But even if Lukács were to be rejected, the problem remains.

Furthermore, what is really the problem with Lukács’s revision, anyway? Exploring that reveals the way to a better solution.

§39

As we have shown, the idea of communism as a pure subjective self-consciousness, is based on the notion that objectivity is just reified social relations. This naturally begs the question of what the content of these social relations consists in, as so far they are only pure form

§40

Marxism is historical materialism, and Communism is just the practical application of historical materialism, via the class-conscious (historical-materialism conscious) proletariat, to society itself. But what does that say about the nature of society in the first place?

§41

It means society is an indescribable ‘totality’ of individual mental states, opinions, and beliefs, - the objectivity of social relationships, is merely a result of the subjective mind ‘reifying’ segments of the totality and treating them as external realities in themselves.

§42

Thus here, society has no real determinate content - it is a pure ‘Kantian Thing-in-Itself,’ a mere totality of individual relations that only asserts its existence negatively, via the reification (‘objectivization’) of its constituent parts.

§43

This means that material relations of production are rooted in reified mental states, not material reality. Consciousness of them (plus action) would dissolve them.

Material society is then defined by ‘that which subjective consciousness has not yet assumed responsibility for!’

§44

Having rejected any specific form of being as *necessarily* material, including nature, it is only upon failing to render the Totality fully transparent that consciousness may renunciate its aspiration to dissolve everything in itself.

Totality is the Lukácsian sublime.

§45

The Totality of individual relations in the form of History, or Society, constitutes a type of absolute objectivity which is not merely a reification - but the free, continuous and holistic content of every possible experience, mental state, and subjectivity.

§46

A totality cannot assume self-consciousness, since it cannot be confined to any one self. So that is simply the end of Scientific Socialism: The only thing that can really be known about society, is that nothing at all can be known. This is no more knowledge than Kant’s Thing.

§47

Subject-Object distinction reemerges, only now between a subjective self-consciousness (in the form of Party, institutions, etc) rendering transparent and assuming responsibility for all determinations of society and the Totality of relations as the supremely impenetrable object.

§48

So we are back to square one, and none wiser in answering:

1. To what extent is society (including all relations of production) itself objective?

2. To what extent is Communism merely a subjective consciousness?

These are the most fundamental questions of Western Marxism.

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§49

I place special emphasis on Western Marxism, since these questions are obvious within the framework of the experience of Marxism-Leninism. There, the question of the objectivity of society, and Communism, were answered practically: In the Soviet Avant-Garde and in the GPCR.

§50

Both of these events ran upon the objective limits of their underlying aspirations, and the wisdom of Marxism-Leninism - whether in Socialism in One Country or in Deng Xiaopings Reform and Opening Up - defined itself in relation to that experience.

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§51

Moreover, Marxism-Leninism is defined within the context of countries where the question of society and the individual is resolved in the concrete bonds of civilization, bonds which were never questioned even at the height of revolutionary experimentation.

§52

In the comparatively atomized West, it is not at all clear to people to what extent society is objective, or to what extent ideas are subjective, even outside Marxist theory. Modern Western thinking doubts absolutely everything about society, even the definition of gender.

§53

The very distinction between subject and object itself is not at all clear in Western society, which is extremely sensitive to algorithmically-driven shifts in culture. Even scientific consensus is (rightfully) called into question, while expert opinion disguises itself as fact.

§54

In contrast to Lukács notion of reification, the real problem with the subject-object distinction cannot but appear to be rooted in the notion of objective Being implied by it, as totally purified of human quality. Despite that in reality, all objects appear somehow tainted by it

§55

When the thinking consciousness is entirely divided from reality, as pure spirit, soul, mind, or cogito - what remains of reality is completely meaningless, and devoid of any moral, historical, spiritual, or human significance.

How could that square with Marx’s view bellow?

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§56

Marxists as early as Plekhanov have also opted for regressing into Spinozism as a means to resolve the problem, where subject and object collapse into the supreme Substance. In this way thinking consciousness is the mere attribute of Substance: the most fundamental form of Being.

§57

Soviet Philosopher Ilyenkov, goes so far as to draw out speculative cosmological implications of this view, according to which thought arises as a necessary attribute of matter to prevent the heat death of the universe, by initiating a conscious cosmic catastrophe to reset it.

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§58

The problem with Spinozism is not the view that mind and matter (‘subject and object’) share reality, but in the notion of reality as ‘Substance:’ a metaphysical view of the object already united with its subjective determinations. Substance thus has no stake in its attributes.

§59

This is just one of the ways of ‘resolving’ the problem by denying it all together: Substance is mere objectivity given Form by the mind. Substance is treated as supreme, antecedent, and given, but it is the repository of a dogmatic subjective determination, not true objectivity.

§60

The Marxist-Spinozist view cannot ground the origins of proletarian consciousness, Marxism, and the Communist party in reality - it represses its own origins, and pretends these arise in perfect continuity with the self-same Substance, effectively gaslighting itself.

§61

This view does not arise from any necessary procedure of thought, experience, or relation to the world. It is a metaphysical view that does not pay for itself in any way - it is an insight that cannot itself be reproduced materially, a pure dogmatism of the mind.

§62

There never comes the decisive gesture of Marx of renouncing knowledge to suspend it back into Being - Substance is the conceit of a knowledge that already inheres in Being, perfectly continuous with the intellect which at no point runs upon the limit of its pretentions.

§63

In practice, it becomes a type of ideological hubris, asserting the unreality and meaninglessness of every actually substantive bond of civilization, in favor of a supreme ‘Substance’ that has neither any skin of its own in the game, nor any reality outside a calcified intellect.

§64

More importantly, it renders Scientific Socialism into a metaphysical dogma, incapable of deriving concrete knowledge of concrete social reality. No specificity of societal objectivity is possible - everything is just ‘capitalism’ permeating the whole of its ‘attributes.’

§65

It is obvious that if ‘everything’ is objective, then nothing in particular is, including society itself. The extent of society’s objectivity is the extent it is continuous with a dogma of the mind. It is no wonder Spinoza is the favorite thinker of pseudo-Marxist academia!

§66

Spinozism is categorically incompatible with Marxism for no other reason than that its foundations make impossible insight into laws governing historical development, and the particular qualitative character of societies. It could not possibly constitute any class-consciousness.

§67

Specifically, it cannot afford any recognition of the objectivity of contradictions (such as the class struggle). In the stead of the objectivity of class struggle lies a pure subjectivist ‘will to immanence,’ a notion of communism as antisocial as Lukácsian “self-consciousness.”

§68

The scholastic concept Substance does not resolve the object-subject distinction (the principal theoretical problem of Western Marxism), but only conceals it. For the 100+ years Western Marxism has confused it with Marx’s materialism, Marxism was condemned metaphysical languish.

§69

It suffices only to recall Marx’s own apt view of Spinoza: A metaphysically disguised objectivity which excludes the objectivity of man, and therefore the socius relevant for Marx’s own materialism.

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§70

Marxism succeeded in overcoming metaphysics, but only within a limited scope of practice. That is namely in the investigations of Marx in Capital, the writings of Fredrich Engels and the concrete historical experience of Marxism-Leninism.

§71

Marx and Engels failed to fully transmit their theoretical genius. Lenin alone inherited it, and gave it practical reality. The genius of Marxism survived as the genius of world-historical statesmen and civilizations, but its original spark of consciousness was lost.

§72

Marxism-Leninism emerged as a type of phronesis, whose advanced outlook was established by the context of the concrete historical experience of Communism. Not strictly a matter of theoretical intellect, but also a type of advanced sensibility based on practical reality.

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§73

Marx’s Promethean gesture acquired objective reality and history exclusively outside the West, where objectivity of society was not metaphysical question, but a given reality. And the problem of metaphysics permeated the whole of Western thinking, not just Western Marxism.

§74

For Marxism to be meaningful in the West, it cannot ignore this problem, for when it does, it always remains trapped within it anyway, inevitably regressing materialist objectivity from practical Scientific Socialism into the scholastic Kantian or Spinozist frame.

§75

In the case of Kantianism (as in Lukács), proletarian objectivity dissolves in the subjectivism of social-dem institutions. In Spinozism, it becomes an intellectual conceit devoid of skin in the game. Revisionism, opportunism, and defeatism are the certain conclusion of both.

§76

The object in the form of ‘capitalism’ - whether as Thing or Substance - becomes so overwhelming and insurmountable, that the comparative weakness of Marxist subjectivity takes in. The paranoiac spectre of ‘fascism’ reflects a consciousness always in retreat before its object.

§77

And hardly anything could affirm that paranoia more than the fact that the thinker who finally initiated the revolution that would emancipate the Western mind from bourgeois metaphysics once and for all, is nearly equally infamous for their affiliation to German Nazism.

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§78

Originally a student of Husserl and the phenomenological school, Martin Heidegger inadvertently lays the foundation for a complete rediscovery of Marx, emancipating Western thought from its metaphysical shackles and opening the way for a truly consistent materialist outlook.

§79

Heidegger elects to orient thought to an origin more fundamental than can be contained within the frame of the reductionist ‘res cogitans/'extensa’ or ‘subject/object’ distinction, and that is toward Being as such. This is the beginning of what is popularly called ontology.

§80

For Heidegger, Being as such pre-exists the classification, categorization, utilization, etc. of particular beings by thought. It is the ‘Being of beings’ - the more fundamental ground by which particular beings are given to us - whether in experience, contemplation, or practice.

§81

He calls the difference between Being & beings the Ontological Difference. Every relation to beings, is based on a fundamental horizon of Being as such. When a specific horizon acquires historical dominance, it is metaphysical - imposing upon Being a specific relation by thought.

§82

The view of the thinking being is set on a foundation far less metaphysically loaded than the Cartesian Subject: as Dasein, a being for which there is a question or openness of Being. Dasein embodies the very discontinuity of Being that justifies the Ontological Difference.

§83

The problem with the subject-object distinction is that it can only regard beings as objects for a given subject. This makes for a notion of objectivity that is a priori idealist. The notion of Subject also implies a specific view of objects as mere utilities for its realization.

§84

Subject, moreover, defined as res cogita, is thought itself taken as its own real object. This implies an alienation of thought from reality, foreclosing its scandalous incipience in Being. This notion is the final conclusion of idealism; for Heidegger metaphysics as such.

§85

Marx already accomplished the rejection of the culmination of idealist philosophy, especially in his early writings. But the incipient materialist language he made use of (man, class, mode of production, etc.), later fell victim to inevitably metaphysical conceptualizations.

§86

Some of these Concepts were involved in the first breakdown of European Marxism itself. The changing nature of capitalist production & role of the proletariat ceased to neatly conform to their Concept, and this was used by Social Democracy to justify its revisionism.

§87

Western Marxism, with its conceptualist orthodoxy, became infiltrated by metaphysics, so it is natural that only a Western thinker entirely outside Marxism - and even entirely opposed to it politically - could initiate the emancipation of Western thought from metaphysics.

§88

Heidegger may have been beset by various idealistic and politically objectionable peculiarities, but these do not define his primary historical significance. His primary significance lies in setting all thought on a basis which asserts its posteriority in the face of Being.

§89

The concept of Dasein helps resolve the fundamental problem of Marxist theory: The Subject/Object paradox and its methodological individualism. For the first time, society, classes, and civilizations can be acknowledged as real in a manner consistent with the materialist view.

§90

Dasein does not necessarily afford contemplation exclusive significance in its overall issue of Being, so it is not just another concept of the subject: Not simply cognition, but practically being-in-the-world, facing the constitutive disjuncture with Being in its very Being.

§91

This overall phenomenological orientation permits thought to acknowledge reality without preemptively attempting to assume the consequences or implications it has for the thinking being. Whatever consequences or implications there may be, they begin with being, not thought.

§92

It is undoubtedly possible that Dasein can be conceived exclusively as an individual, but unlike the concept of the Subject, it is not necessarily so. Being as such is a common well-spring that cuts across individuated ‘subjects,’ and is the staging ground of any shared reality.

§93

Moreover, without acknowledging the incipience of thought from more fundamental Being, Marxist materialism becomes an absurdity: Materiality becomes identical to the thought of materiality (like Substance), and thus an idea! In this way, materialism easily becomes idealism.

§94

Dasein is constitutively a being already thrown in a world, a world not only not of its choosing, but whose givenness, in the form of beings, cannot be pre-emptively defined by thoughts, ideas or concepts. It rather rests upon a relation to Being as such, which can only be uncovered.

§95

The real individual is thus set against a background within which their very individuated identity is subordinated to a more fundamental horizon of Being. Dasein, in its incipience, knows no distinction between individuals, or itself and others. It is not even a collective.