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注释： 1 原文为《Fictitious Capital and Contracted Social Reproduction
Today: China and Permanent Revolution》，Insurgent
Notes 第八期2013年。作者戈尔德纳（Loren Goldner）是美国自由撰稿人，他所编辑的独立共产主义网刊是insurgentnotes.com，其他作品在他个人网站Break Their Haughty
Power（home.earthlink.net/~lrgoldner）。 2 Grundrisse, 1973 ed. p. 706. 3 On the recycling of Petrodollars
into U.S. capital markets cf. Michael Hudson, Global Fracture (1977) 4 This has been modified somewhat
in the past year by the Longview (Washington) longshore struggle, the
stalemated Verizon strike of summer 2011, the defeated Caterpillar strike and
the just-concluded (mid-September 2012) Chicago teachers strike. But for the
40-year period in question, 20% of American workers were involved in strikes or
lockouts each year in the 1970’s, and only 0.05% in 2009. Cf. my article “The
Sky Is Always Darkest Just Before the Dawn: Class Struggle in the U.S. from
2008 to the Eve of Occupy” on the Break Their Haughty Power web site
http://home.earthlink.net/~lrgoldner 5 South Korea joined the OECD in
1996; Taiwan was restricted to “observer status”, under pressure from China. 6 These also include Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Thailand. 7 Africa has 13% of the world’s
population and 3% of world GDP. 8 In key countries such as the
US, the UK and Germany unemployment rates never fell below 8%. At the same
time, in both the US and Germany, major firms engaged in capital-intensive
rationalization. 9 Which also included some
important technological innovation in the 1920’s and even in the 1930’s in
electronics, chemicals and automobile production. 10 The “immediate sphere of
capitalist production” is of course the subtitle of vol. I of Capital. It is
important to note the “Hegelian” echoes in the term “immediate”, which means
“not yet mediated”, not yet passed through the “work of the dialectic” to be elevated to the level of “capital
in and for itself”. This is indeed Marx’s meaning, and the task of vols. II and
III. 11 “Capitalization” refers to the
practice of valuing an asset based on the anticipated profit it will generate,
with reference to a “floor”, usually (in recent decades) the current rate of
interest on a U.S. Treasury bill. If a $10,000 T-bill pays 2%, a $10,000
corporate bond paying 4% is “capitalized” at e.g. $12,000; a comparable bill
paying 1% (or 0.1%, as is the case at this writing) is worth $9,000, and so on.
When one considers this concept applied to a 100-year old slum tenement, paid
off decades ago and depreciated for tax purposes five times since, but still
generating $1 million a year in rental income with minimal expenses for upkeep,
the capitalized value and the “real” value can diverge far more widely. 12 These include pushing the
total wage below the cost of reproducing labor power; the incorporation of
labor power from outside the core wage labor-capital relations, as in massive
recruitment of petty producers from the countryside; the running down of fixed
capital past its full depreciation period; and the looting of nature, as in
environmental destruction, strip mining or depletion of soils through
agricultural exploitation. All of these amount to “non- replacement”
(non-reproduction) or either C (constant capital) or V (variable capital). See
my “Fictitious Capital for Beginners: Imperialism, ‘Anti-Imperialism’,
and the Continuing Relevance of Rosa Luxemburg”, http://home.earthlink.net/~lrgoldner/imperialism.html 13 The movement M-C-M’ is based
on the simple M-C-M movement of exchange described in the opening chapters of
vol. I of Capital; M-C-M’ is the money thrown into the valorization process by
the individual capitalist, in which M’ returns as M expanded by contact with
living, exploited labor power. These triadic movements further form the opening
section of Vol. II, in which Marx considers circulation from the points of
departure of money capital, of production and of the commodity. Finally, in
vol. III we find the breakdown of the M-C-M’ movement in the heart of crisis,
showing the “architecture” of the three volumes to be based on a phenomenology
moving from the “simple cell” (the commodity) through to full-blown breakdown
of accumulation. The truth is in the whole, the oak is the truth of the acorn
(Hegel) and the simple commodity form already implies the breakdown of the
system. 14 This was marked by excess
corporate debt (a postwar high of the “debt to equity ratio”), which came under
intense pressure with the May 1970 collapse of the Penn Central Railroad, and
ensuing near-bankruptcies of such major firms as Lockheed and Rolls Royce. See
John Brooks, The Go-Go Years (1971). 15 Trading in the dollar was
suspended for several days at that time, as world foreign exchanges became
concerned over the outflow of gold from the U.S, undermining the whole
foundation of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. 16 “It was at this juncture
(early 1970’s-LG) where the U.S. state itself…jumped onto the bandwagon by
fashioning Eurodollar market-based speculation against the inflating U.S.
dollar into de facto U.S. government policy. The rapid upward spiking of
Eurodollar loans…is indicative of …real capital investment dearth in the
moribund US production-centered economy.” Richard Westra, The Evil Axis of
Finance. The U.S.-Japan-China Stranglehold on the Global Future (2012) p. 99. 17 The real basis of this
increase is controversial; some explain it by the classical operation of the
laws of ground rent (either Ricardian or Marxist); others (cf. S. Artesian in
Insurgent Notes Nos. 3 and 4) disagree. Be that as it may, the effect on world
financial markets was neutralized by agreements of the major exporters in the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to recycle their
“Petrodollars” back into the Western financial system, (Michael Hudson, Global
Fracture, 1977), primarily in New York and in U.S. government paper (Treasury
Bills), as well as direct investment in the Western economies. The effect on
most countries, particularly those in the Third World, was not neutralized,
resulting in an exponential increase in their foreign indebtedness through the
1970’s and 1980’s, and in the subsequent IMF and World Bank enforced austerity
programs. Meanwhile, the OPEC countries acquired billions of dollars of
state-of-the-art weaponry, primarily from the U.S. Hudson’s book describes both
the arrangement between the US government and the main oil producers to recycle
“petrodollars” in US capital markets, but also the large-scale acquisition of
weaponry and some Western assets by OPEC governments. 18 The Mont Pelerin Society was
founded in 1948 by these die-hard anti-Keynesians, who were in the wilderness
until the 1970’s “stagflation” era, as well as military dictatorships in Chile
and Argentina, gave them their moment. For these “anti-statists”, some states
are not as bad as others, a proclivity they had already shown in their 1930’s
preference for fascism over “communism”. 19 Chile, Argentina and Uruguay
were the laboratories for neo-liberal policies, under extreme military
dictatorships. In Chile, the “Chicago boys” had been preparing for their moment
since the mid-1950’s, in collaboration with a small university in Santiago. See
T. Moulian, Chile actual : anatomía de un mito, 1997. 20 Michael Perelman, The
Pathology of the U.S. Economy Revisited (2002) not only provides extensive
material on the decline of infrastructure in the U.S. economy (pp. 80-91) but
also shows how the dominant neo-classical paradigm is blind to the very
question of material reproduction: “…Keynes must have known that depreciation
charges cover the vast majority of all investment…Still, he generally assumed
that capital replacement ocurrs automatically when a capital good reaches a
certain age…You might wonder why anyone should care about the distinction
between replacement investment and investment in general. In fact, inadequate
replacement investment was one of the keys to the decline of the U.S. economy
in during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s” (ibid. p. 114). “…accurate data on
the scrapping and upgrading of installed plant and capital do not exist…Over
time, more and more capital goods ceased to be very productive, falling into
the category of phantom capacity… (in the postwar boom), management gave little
indication that it had much of an inclination to maintain a healthy capital
stock (ibid. pp. 134-135 21 From 1945 to 1968, the gap
between the richest and poorest fifth of the populations of OECD countries
steadily declined; after 1968, it reversed itself and became greater than prior
to the 1930’s depression. 22 This gap should not obscure
the “grey” reality of greatly increased poverty in the “rich” countries and the
existence of an important, wealthy “globalized” group in the “poor” countries,
as in the cases of China, India, Mexico or Brazil. 23 With the mantra that “market
forces” are always superior to the “state”, these privatizations almost
invariably tended to make services more expensive, often followed by bankruptcy
and their simple disappearance. Sometimes there was a “public-private” collaboration,
(as in one example among thousands) the recent case of a Virginia judge whose
juvenile court sentenced thousands of teenagers, usually with the most rapid
sham trial for the most trivial offense, to a private prison which charged
their families serious money for incarceration. In the U.S. invasion of Iraq,
thousands of private “consultants” in such burgeoning fields as “security” were
performing tasks previously done by military personnel. 24 On the psychological damage
wrought by this casualization, cf. Richard Sennett, The corrosion of character
: the personal consequences of work in the new capitalism (1998); though deeply
flawed, Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2000) is an arresting presentation of
the many forms of enforced solitude in the new organization of labor and
society. 25 Answering skeptics about U.S.
de-industrialization, Michael Perelman writes: “”the government data are
misleading because they overstate the share of manufacturing in the aggregate
economy, because they fail to account for the imports used in production…the
government merely tallies the final output of the manufacturing sector.” (Cf.
Perelman, op. cit., p. 173. The U.K. went from having 25% of international
trade in 1952 to 2.9% in 2012. Cf. Nicholas Comfort. Surrender. How British
Industry Gave Up the Ghost 1952-2012 (2012). For one excellent case study of
de-industrialization and its impact, cf. David Ranney’s study of Chicago,
Global Decisions, Local Collisions (2003). 26 Tom Frank, One market under
God : extreme capitalism, market populism, and the end of economic democracy
(2000), shows (among other things) the ideological origins of this new
constellation in the American counter-culture of the 1960’s, as part of the
“revolutionary” revolt against “bureaucracy”. 27 “…the rise in interest rates
savaged third world economies with output dropping to such an extent that it
would not be until 1996 that third world output as a whole approached the level
it had attained in 1979.” Westra, op. cit. p. 88. 28 “Between 1980 and 2002, the
third world remitted $4.6 trillion to financial institutions based in the
advanced OECD states.” “(This) “ensured that they would never again be able to
attempt full-scale industrialization…and would stay the IMF/WB (World Bank)
course since debts forever compound, eliminating possibility of repayment.”
Westra, op. cit. p. 100. “Thus, in manufacturing, (TW countries) are rendered
little more than cogs in globally dispersed and fragmented value chains.” (p.
104) 29 Hazy historical memory and America-centric
Cold War triumphalism attribute the collapse of the Soviet bloc to Ronald
Reagan’s 1980’s vast rearmament. In fact, the Soviet bloc had been sinking into
stagnation and torpor since the 1970’s; Emmanuel Todd, in his 1976 La chute
finale: essai sur la decomposition du sphere sovietique, had already pointed
out that birth rates in Russia, the empire’s heartland, had turned negative.
Gorbachev, for his part, claimed after his fall that it was the Polish workers’
uprising of 1980-81 that convinced him that the system as it existed was
finished. 30 Either in prison or awaiting
trial or on parole. Cf. Christian Parenti, Lockdown America (1999) 31 “Small state” neo-liberalism
also had its finest moment in international trade and tariffs with the so-called
Doha Round (2001-2011). Where the “Washington Consensus” had been all too happy to force
weaker countries to drop their protection of local industry and agriculture,
the Doha Round failed (in 2011) because of the refusal of Western countries,
led by the U.S., to lower tariffs protecting their own domestic industries and
agriculture. 32 The leveraged buyout strategy
(LBO) took advantage of an old (1909) corporate tax law which made stock
dividends subject to income tax but interest payments on corporate debt tax
deductible. Hence the LBO artists were able to shift corporate balance sheets
from equity (stock) to debt, claiming a nice tax deduction in the process. Cf,
George Anders, Merchants of Debt: KKR and the Mortgaging of American Business
(1992) and Connie Bruck, The Predators’ Ball (1988). 33 “Because of the vast sums of
money that the bailout consumed, the government curtailed spending on health,
education and infrastructure.” (Perelman op. cit. p. 148) 34 According to the World Bank’s
Global Financial Development (2012), Third World debt today totals $4 trillion.
It has receded from the headlines primarily because, in 90 or 100 national
cases, it has been “rationalized” with the principal written off as
uncollectible, and the country in thrall to interest-only payments stretching
far into the future. 35 Rubin was a spokesman par
excellence for the ascendancy of finance over production in the “New Economy”:
Douglas Dowd points out “Corporate profits were more than ten times as high as
net interest in 1949; more than five times in 1959; more than two-and-a-half
times in 1969; a quarter more in 1979; in 1989 and since corporate profits have
been less than net interest.” (quoted in Perelman, op. cit. p. 151)
“(Christoper Niggle)…notes that the ratio of the book value of financial
institutions to the GNP of the U.S. was 78.4 in 1960…By 1984, it had reached
107.4.” (ibid. p 158) 36 A muckraking account of
Clinton’s strong-arm campaign to force through NAFTA is in John MacArthur. The
Selling of “Free Trade”. (2000). NAFTA more than anything was an abolition of
prior Mexican restrictions on capital flows and imports, and quickly threw
millions of Mexicans into unemployment. 37 Health care costs in the U.S.,
then as now, are higher than in any comparable country, and still leave 45
million people uninsured. Estimates of the additional cost of the “take” of
private insurers (HMOs, Health Management Organizations) are on the order of
20-30% of total cost, which amounts to 14% of “GDP”. Obama’s “Affordable
Healthcare Act”, legally requires the uninsured to purchase private health care
costing more than $1000 per month for a family of four, or face stiff fines.
George Bush Jr. had preceded this gift to the HMOs with a $500 billion gift to
the pharmaceutical companies in his loudly-touted subsidies to seniors for
their medication. Less touted was the cost-plus prices for these drugs
established on a “no bid” basis, as well as other legislation and government
action forbidding states to buy cheaper drugs in Canada. 38 The tax rates on the
wealthiest income strata in the U.S. into the late 1970’s was 52%; today it is
25%. 39 This “see-saw” of the dollar
has followed the business cycle going back to the 1950’s; it amounts to the
tossing of the bubble of hot air back and forth between the U.S. and its
creditors. The dollar crisis began in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, during
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system; after the end of Bretton Woods in
1971-73, the dollar declined against the yen and European currencies. The U.S.
balance of payments has been at zero or in surplus only
in a few years coming out of recession. As soon as “recovery” kicks in (1975,
1983, 1994, 2003) it goes negative and dollars resume accumulating abroad. It
is one manifestation of the “seignorage” privilege of the world reserve
currency; the U.S. alone prints the currency in which its massive foreign debts
are denominated, and as in the 1970’s (with Germany and Japan) or with Japan
(1985) or potentially today with the Asian central banks, led by China,
depreciates those debts representing billions of exports to the U.S. As Richard
Westra puts it, “…the main villains of the Asian Crisis were really the U.S.
itself…By the mid-1990’s bloating US current account deficits and private
sector borrowing requirements desperately needed monies that were flowing into
a Japan-centered economic growth pole…Through the G-7, then, the U.S. sought to
correct “misalignments” of major currencies vis a vis the dollar which Treasury
Secretary Rubin deemed were not reflective of purportedly strong U.S. economic
“fundamentals”…we can concur with Michael Burke that no account of the
purported US new econom “boom” can do justice to the question in absence of
consideration of the Asian Crisis.” (op. cit. pp. 132-134) 40 “Japan’s net foreign assets
rose from 10 to 30 percent of GDP between 1990 and 1998…in 1997 and 1998
Japan’s external position of $958 billion and $1.153 trillion respectively is a
virtual mirror image of that of the U.S., -$1.066 trillion and -$1.537 trillion
respectively.” Westra op. cit. p. 128. 41 The bond market reflects the
process of “capitalization” described earlier. When general interest rates
rise, they immediately lower the value of all bonds paying less than the going
rate of interest. The 1994 rate rise left bond dealers, who earn their
commissions with a constant turnover, with large portfolios of such devalued
bonds. 42 After Brazil’s “lost decade”
following the 1982 debt crisis, it suffered a second lost decade in the 1990’s.
Cf. I. Lesbaupin (coordinator) O Desmonte da Nacao. Balanco do Governo FHC
(1999). As elsewhere, neo-liberal policies in Brazil included further upward
transfer of wealth in what was already one of the world’s most unequal
societies, the fracturing of social security and health care, and large-scale
sell-off of public assets at bargain-basement prices. In Mexico, “the 30 years
1982-2012 are a single unity, made possible by the alliance between the PRI
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional) and the PAN (Partido de la Alianza
Nacional). This includes selective and massive repression, the disappearance of
people, electoral fraud, the change of generation with the arrival of young
people with no future who have adapted to a degraded situation, the
reorganization of school curriculum eliminating historical consciousness (even
in its bourgeois, constitutionalist, liberal, national forms) …” (“Letter from
Mexico”, forthcoming in Insurgent Notes No. 7, October 2012). Following the
1982 debt crisis, the living standards of Mexican workers and peasants fell by
50%; following the 1994-95 crisis, they fell by another 50%. “The reduction of
the wages of Mexican workers was achieved at the same time as the Pinochet
regime, with the sole aim of making Mexico into an international maquiladora
center.” (ibid.) 43 One account among many is
Donald Kirk, Korean Crisis. Unraveling of the Miracle in the IMF Era (1999).
Under IMF bailout conditions, all candidates for the Korean presidency in
December 1997 had to sign off on their commitment to honor the IMF austerity
package. 44 Even a Cold Warrior of
impeccable credentials such as Richard Nixon denounced the West’s miserly,
vengeful treatment of prostrate Russia after its collapse. 45 On this, see the article “The
Harvard Boys Do Russia” http://www.thenation.com/article/harvard-boys-do-russia#.
The author later wrote a book-length treatment of this Ivy League/ U.S.
government/ Wall Street looting condominum: Janine R Wedel, Collision and
Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe (2001). Another
member of the “best and the brightest” was French Mitterand ideologue Jacques
Attali, who in 1991 helped found the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), ostensibly to finance the Russian transition, and later
resigned under a cloud of scandal. 46 In the 2006 report The World
Economy (2 vols., 2006) of the very official OECD’s Development Center Studies,
we learn (p. 25) that as of 1998, in Eastern Europe and Russia taken as a
whole, there had a 25% fall since 1973. Unemployment (p. 133) in western Europe
in 1994-1998 averaged 11%, higher than that of the 1930’s. 47 See Nicholas Dunbar, Inventing
money : the story of Long-term Capital Management and the legends behind it
(2000) 48 Westra, op. cit. p. 81: “…at
bottom, globalization is simply a sexed up term for the US transubstantiation
into a global economy; a global economy where the U.S. parlays dollar
seignorage into a Wall Street-dominated international financial axis through
which it then shapes the world’s material goods production on which it is
dependent…” 49 Cf. the essay of M.
Hart-Landsberg et al. “China and the Dynamics of Transnational Accumulation”,
in M. Hart-Landsberg et al. Marxist Perspectives on South Korea in the Global
Economy (2007). “…in 2004, China and the US accounted for almost half of the
world’s growth…In 2002, China became the largest recipient of FDI in the
world…China’s economic growth has been increasingly dependent on the export
activity of these transnational corporations.” (pp. 116-117) 50 Cf. Westra. op. cit. p. 85:
Wal-Mart was “the number one single U.S. employer with 1.3 million workers…by
2003. Wal-Mart sales that year were $256 billion…it wielded a network of 60,000
suppliers in over 55 countries. It is estimated that Wal-Mart brought low price
savings to U.S. consumers from 1985 to 2007 to the tune of $287 billion!” 51 In the The World Economy (2
vols., 2006) (op. cit. ) we learn (p. 25) that as of 1998, in 168 countries
totaling one-third of the world’s population, there has been no economic
advance since 1980. 52 From 1985 to 1998, Russia
suffered the worst demographic contraction ever recorded in peacetime, during
which life expectancy fell one year per year from 65 to 52. 53 Unemployment (p. 133) in
western Europe in 1994-1998 averaged 11%, higher than that of the 1930’s, and
had averaged 8-10% through the 80’s and 90’s as a whole. 54 Cf. David Ost, The defeat of
Solidarity : anger and politics in postcommunist Europe (2005) for a portrait
of some of these cities, which had provided the shock troops for Solidarnosc in
1980-81, after which the aspiring globalized yuppie class reaped the benefits,
both in Poland and as expatriates. 55 Among many books on Enron, the
paradigmatic corporate Ponzi scheme of the Goldilocks “New Economy”, cf. B.
McLean/P. Elkind. The Smartest Guys in the Room. (2003). Enron perfected the
art of concealing debts “off balance sheet” while reporting inflated fictitious
profits to boost the company’s stock, which the top executives then secretly sold at their peak,
inflicting billions in losses on shareholders, including Enron’s own employees,
who received a significant part of their compensation in Enron shares. 56 Cf. B. McLean/J. Nocera All
the Devils Are Here (2010) for material on the sub-prime phenomenon. The
expansion of housing in turn fed expansions in furniture and household
appliances; it was estimated as the boom peaked that these sectors in concert
accounted for 50% of all economic activity in the U.S., financed by foreign
capital (above all European banks), which in turn was caught in the downdraft
when the bust began. 57 The U.S. Federal debt went
from $1 trillion to $4 trillion between 1980 and 2000; the U.S., which had been
a global creditor since World War I became a net international debtor in 1984;
this net indebtedness (dollars held abroad minus U.S. overseas assets) is
currently estimated at $5 trillion. 58 Westra, op. cit. p. 19: “prior
to the recent meltdown the U.S. coveted approximately 70 per cent of all
international financial flows to finance its deficit which constitutes over
1.5% of total global GDP.” 59 Chinese overseas investments
prioritize access to raw materials, as in Canada (cf. Financial Times,
10/11/21) ,South Sudanese oil (FT 2/21/12) and Australia (FT, 6/25/12); the
Chinese Development Bank lent Venezuela $20 billion in 2010 to secure oil
shipments (FT 9/24/12). Chinese construction firms build in Africa and Asia,
and increasingly look to the EU and U.S. markets (FT, 9/14/11); the
infrastructure company Sinohydro has projects underway in 55 countries in
Africa and South America (FT 1/4/12) and is moving into Europe (FT 1/21-22/12)
as for example into UK utilities (FT, 7/18/11); the agribusiness company Cofco
bought the Chateau Viaud vineyard in France (Financial Times 2/5-6/12); Chinese
banks have lent $75 billion to Latin America since 2005 (FT, 2/16/12); Chinese
exporters have tripled their market share in Africa since 2002 (FT, 3/27/12);
China’s trade with Africa was $150 billion in 2011, and hundreds of thousands
of Chinese unemployed are setting up as traders there (FT 5/8/12); it is
increasing investment in eastern Europe (FT 5/18/12); the State Administration
for Foreign Exchange has $300 billion to invest, with a “determination to
diversify its investments, especially away from U.S. government debt and the
dollar.” (FT 6/12/12). Last but not least, Chinese acquisitions of U.S. assets
have already totaled $8 billion in 2012 (FT 8/23/12) and the Chinese
Development Bank has $985 billion in assets and operations in 130 countries (FT
8/24/12). 60 This move into Africa is not
without its critics, such as South African president Jacob Zuma, who said in
July (FT 7/20/12) that “Africa’s past economic experience with Europe dictates
a need to be cautious…”. after China announced $20 billion in loans to the
continent. 61 See FT, 5/15/12. 62 Germany in 1922 had already
established the Rapallo treaty with the Soviet Union to break out of the
isolation imposed by the Treaty of Versailles; Willy Brandt’s early 1970’s
“Ostpolitik” moved (more mildly) in the same direction; Gerhard Schroeder, SPD
Chancellor from 1999 to 2005, cultivated close ties with Putin to assure a
steady flow of natural gas. 63 FT, 4/13 and 4/14/2010. 64 Marx uses the term “permanent
revolution” in the 1850 Address to the Communist League. The term refers to the
role of the working class in a country where the national bourgeoisie (Germany in 1848,
Russia in 1905 and 1917) is too weak to fight the ancien regime without
enlisting the support of the working class, the “Fourth Estate”. Hence the
possibility of the working class going beyond the confines of bourgeois demands
and making the revolution “permanent”. Trotsky and Parvus deepened the theory
in applying it to Russia, well before Trotsky proclaimed himself a Bolshevik in
1917; in my view, it constitutes his most important contribution to Marxism and
can be separated from his later Bolshevism, particularly since prior to 1905 he
had already uncannily foreseen the authoritarian trajectory of Bolshevism in
his prescient and little-read critiques of Lenin in Report of the Siberian
Delegation (1903) and Our Tasks (1904). 65 See my text on Asian
capitalist development 1868-1930 on the Break Their Haughty Power web site:
http://home.earthlink.net/~lrgoldner/asiamarx.html 66 This convergence is most
concisely stated in the excellent book of Bruno Astarian, Luttes de classes
dans la Chine des reformes (1978-2009) (2009), especially pp. 147-152. 67 These countries include
Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia and China. |
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